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Abstract 
 
European countries embarked on a European integration programme that saw the formation of 
the Euro, which has emerged as a major currency (Blair, 1999) that was introduced in 1998. 
With the Euro, came the establishment of the European Central Bank. Thus this study seeks to 
investigate the flaws in the formation of the European Central Bank that surfaced during the 
major economic crisis in Europe. The crisis revealing the gaps in the formation and structure of 
the European central bank  have created major challenges for the Economic and  Monetary 
Union (EMU). Through an extant review of literature the study will examine the East African 
Community Countries, investigating the ties they have to the  euro zone to analyse how the 
crisis has affected them. Furthermore, the study will analyse what would happen to the growth 
patterns of the East African Countries and the various prospects they may have should the 
Eurozone come to an end.  
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1. Introduction 
 
The ECB is the sixth out of seven institutions of the European Union as listed in the treaty 
designed by the E.U (Europa, 2004; ECB 2004a). It is the central bank for the Euro and is the 
embodiment of modern central banking; price stability is regarded as the overriding objective of 
its monetary policy (Blair, 1999). It is independent with a clear and mandate, and the bank is 
accountable for the execution of this mandate (ECB, 2004b; ECB, 2010). The bank`s capital 
stock is owned by the central banks of all 17 EU member states (Blair, 1999).The treaty of 
Amsterdam in 1998 saw the establishment of the ECB, and is headquartered in Germany (Yale 
press, 2008). The key tasks of the ECB are to “define and implement the monetary policy for the 
euro zone, to conduct foreign exchange operations, to take care of the foreign reserves of the 
European  system  of  central  banks  and  promote  smooth  operation  of  the  financial  market 
infrastructure and the technical platform for securities in Europe” (ECB, 2010, p.15). 
The  ECB`s  corporate  structure  is  defined  by  an  executive  board  comprising  of  the 
President,  Vice  President  and  four  members  nominated  by  the  euro  zone  countries  (ECB, 
2004a). Decisions are influenced by the governing council which is made up of the executive 
board members including the heads of the euro zone central banks (ECB, 2010). The system 
functions as a web, with the ECB in the middle formulating the monetary policy and the central 
banks on the outside implementing it (Civitas, 2011). In June 2011, Italian Mario Droghi was 
voted to be the  next  President of the  ECB for the  period November 2011 to October 2019    
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(Bethell, 2012). This sparked controversy for as it stands executive board now contains two 
Italians  and  there  is  no  French  presence  (ECB,  2012;  Bethell,  2012).  The  euro  has  been 
regarded as one of the experiments in monetary history that are most exciting (Jonung and 
Drea, 2010). In the euro adopted countries, the national central banks do not issue out currency 
anymore, though the duties they still perform include economic forecasting, operation of part of 
the payment system and financial supervision (European Commission, 2012). The concept of 
the euro  was founded on  the optimum currency area theory  that  was made popular by the 
economist Robert Mundell in 1961. He believed that a currency area that comprises of different 
countries with their own currencies, the rate of employment for the poor countries is dependent 
on the richer countries, with the inflation rate being set by central authorities that will be able to 
allow for unemployment in the poor countries (Mundell, 1968; Hunter, 1991; Scott, 1998). 
 
2. Literature Review 
 
2.1. Arguments against the ECB Formation 
 
The idea of forming a European Central Bank was met with a lot of skepticism; although the 
bank has been formed there were questions and issues raised by those concerned about the 
future of Europe with the Central Bank in play. Civitas (2011) cited some points against the 
formation of the ECB as: 
  It is impossible to formulate a currency for countries with different growth strategies as 
they have different needs 
  The powerful countries in the region influence decisions 
  The different states will conduct their business separate from the requirements of the 
ECB 
 
Further argument states that the Euro is to blame for the slow pace of Europe’s efforts 
to repair its position especially where economic dynamism is migrating to countries like America 
and Asia (Yale press, 2008; Molle, 2006). The key issue is that of Germany,  which is regarded 
as Europe’s strongest economy where fixed European exchange rates provide disproportionate 
support for Germany’s export- oriented economy (Blair,  1999) by making its industrial sales 
extremely  competitive  through-out  most  of  Europe,  increasing  Germany’s  export  surplus  to 
record levels (Europa, 2004; IMF, 2010). It is argued that the common currency has exposed 
shortcomings in economic policy (Darvas, 2012) among member countries that can no longer 
be  rectified  by  devaluation  therefore  they  need  to  be  corrected  by  painfully  longer-term 
adjustments for-instance through lower- wage rises, increased working hours and job losses 
(Sleight, 2012; IMF, 2012). 
When looking at the history of currency union’s, member states had some misgivings 
because currency unions have had very little success in the past and from the beginning there 
was no guarantee that the ECB would perform well. Coincidentally, the Euro was viewed as a 
recipe  for  economic  stagnation  (Massa  et  al.  2011)  and  higher  levels  of  unemployment 
especially  if  the  ECB  pursued  the  deflationary  monetary  policy  (Bethell,  2012).  From  the 
formation of the ECB it was predicted that the monetary union will not succeed and currencies 
that find themselves to in difficulty may be forced to cancel their membership and re- establish 
an  independent  currency  and  an  inflationary  monetary  policy  (Alesina  and  Grilli,  1992; 
Chatterjee,  2003).  The  example  is  given  of  Ireland  how  they  chose  to  leave  the  Sterling 
currency area suggesting that leaving a currency union is beneficial as compared to joining one 
(Kirkby, 2012). 
From the time the European union was being established it was noted that there are 
structural differences within the countries of Europe (Goodman, 1996) meaning that there will 
be economic shocks such as a crisis of supply of primary products which will lead to imbalances 
and there will be no mechanism to restore the balance (Schwartz, 1990; Calomiris, 1998). To 
add to this since there will only be one interest rate that is meant to apply to all countries in the 
region, this means that individual countries that increase their debt will raise interest rates in all 
other  countries  (Molle,  2006),  EU  countries  may  have  to  increase  their  intra-  EU  transfer 
payments to help regions in need (Moeller, 2011; Darvas, 2012). It was stated that it may prove    
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difficult  to  maintain  a  currency  union  than  ending  one  in  the  sense  that  adjusting  to  a  new 
currency will involve substantial costs for businesses and banks (Tsoukalis, 1993). Adjustments 
to economic divergence by migration of labor or capital will be costly and there is no European 
currency commitment to relieve these costs (Douglas and Xavier, 2002). 
Some  reasons  against  the  ECB  formation  were  noted  by  Schwartz  (1990)  and 
Dornbusch (1996), to be that: 
 
  Recessions make it difficult for devaluation and export to take place 
  Steps have to be taken to counter the inequalities that exist in the different states 
  Differences among the member states will create difficulties for national economies to 
come up with recovery plans 
  The interest rates will not be suitable for the whole region 
 
Further reasons against the ECB were highlighted to expose the structural defect within 
the euro system, namely that there is a monetary union that is in place and it does not work in 
line with a fiscal union. In the zone`s system, countries are required to follow a similar fiscal 
policy, but they do not have common treasury to enforce it (Canale, 2010). There is also the 
problem  that  the  euro  zone  system  has  a  difficult  structure  for  quick  response  as  it  is  a 
requirement to have unanimous agreement for decision- making from all member states. This 
leading to failure to prevent contagion to other areas, as it would be hard for the countries in the 
region to respond quickly to the problem (Europa, 2004). Furthermore, the link between the 
fiscal policy and the monetary policy of the ECB was predetermined to put the currency in a 
precarious position as the success rate of the single currency was noted to be dependent on the 
ability of the national fiscal bodies to ensure there is discipline (Jordan, 1997). Constraints on 
individual  member  states  were  predicted  to  arise  in  the  future  due  to  the  exclusion  of  the 
monetary policy from the fiscal policies. 
From onset the ECB had a clear mandate in Article 105 of the Maastricht treaty in that 
their  primary  goal  was  to  maintain  price  stability  (Blair,  1999),  however  it  was  argued  that 
although this mandate may be beneficial towards the goal of long- term credibility, but it did not 
address  how  future  conflicts  between  national  interests  may  be  resolved,  because  of  the 
imbalance of power in the structure of the ECB (Wynne, 1999). Research carried out on the 
Maastricht treaty`s ambiguousness in exchange rate policy revealed that the instability in the 
policies adopted, as there was a loophole that left abundant room for conflict to arise between 
price stability and exchange rate stability meaning that the independence of the ECB would be 
threatened (Goodfriend, 1999; Wynne, 1999). Some critics questioned the success of the ECB 
and the Euro in the long run as it depended on whether employment opportunities would be 
accessible across national borders and whether wages and prices would be flexible (Eudey, 
1998). Prior to the formation of the currency area, it was argued that Western Europe did not 
have a conducive environment that would be suitable for a common currency (Meade, 1957; 
Eichengreen, 1993), as the mobility of labor was nonexistent as such a more effective way to 
promote internal stability and balance of payment system would be to have a system of flexible 
exchange rates. It was believed that the flaws in the architecture of the ECB was comprised of 
policy mistakes that were made by an ECB executive board that did not have the essential 
experience  to  begin  with  and  this  was  seen  through  the  ECB`s  failure  to  release  inflation 
forecasts and they brushed over policy disagreements between the ECB officials (Eichengreen, 
2000). 
 
2.2. History of the Euro Crisis 
 
Prior to the crisis taking root it was assumed that sovereign debt from the zone was safe (Mafi-
Kent and Sobel, 2006). Banks took up large quantities of bonds from weaker economies such 
as Greece which offered a small premium and the assumption was they were equally sound 
(IMF, 2010). With the development of the crisis it became apparent that Greece and possibly 
other  countries’  bonds  offered  substantially  more  risk  (Canale,  2010).  Contributing  to  this 
apparent lack of information about the risk of European debt was conflict of interest whereby the 
banks were earning a lot of money through underwriting bonds (Esrati, 2011). It is believed that 
the crisis should be regarded as both political and economic, and to make it worse a large    
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number of withdrawals have occurred in banks in the zone states such as Greece and Spain 
(Moeller,  2011).  Bank  deposits  in  the  zone  are  insured,  but  by  agencies  of  each  member 
government therefore should banks fail; it is unlikely the government will be able to fully honor 
their commitment especially in Euro’s (Blair, 1999),  the possibility has become greater that 
these countries might abandon the  currency and return to their national currencies (Vaubel, 
2004). In looking at the causes of the Euro crisis Spethman and Steiger (2004), cited a few 
reasons 
  A shortage central monetary institutions 
  Nationally different real interest rates  
  Securities that are non- marketable 
  Where the lender of last resort is not available 
 
 
Profligacy is what the German`s feel the euro crisis is about, with Greece being the 
instigator of the negative tones in the region by lying to the rest of the member states about their 
circumstances and yet still continuing to live extravagantly. This affected troubled euro zone 
members like Italy, Spain, Portugal and Ireland who had enjoyed a period of low interest rates 
for about a decade. Most of the euro zone countries succumbed to the financial crisis due to the 
fact  that  they  operated  with  current  account  deficits  that  were  unsustainable.  As  a  result 
domestic spending was fuelled by low interest rates at the same time managing to hold down 
inflation in goods and wages, thus imports became somewhat cheap but made exports highly 
expensive. The statistics of the euro zone countries standing in relation to the budget deficit and 
public debt is seen in Figure 1 compiled by Eurostat (2012). 
 
 
Figure 1. Budget deficit and public debt to GDP - 2012 
Source: Eurostat (2012) 
 
In essence, the European Sovereign debt crisis also called the euro zone crisis refers to 
the  predicament  that  most  countries  in  the  euro  zone  had  fallen  into  whereby  it  became 
impossible for them to re-finance or pay back their government debt. The causes of the crisis 
are different from one country to another for example in Greece, they had public sector wages 
and pension funds that were high and unsustainable causing levels of debt to rise. A lot has 
transpired over the years that kept on increasing the level of the debt crisis in the euro zone. 
Table  1  lists  but  a  few  examples  of  what  has  been  taking  place  over  the  past  years  that 
contributed to the euro crisis as it stands today,  
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Table 1. History of the ECB, timeline 
Source: ECB (2012) 
 
Greece presently has received another bailout however, the health of the euro zone is 
still at risk as it may be some time before the zone starts to recover, but this too is subject to 
whether defaulting countries that have received a bailout will perform better and pay off their 
loans as the fear gripping most countries in the EU is that Greece will once again not be able to 
pay  and  if  the  euro  zone  suffers  any  further  it  will  affect  the  other  countries  as  well.  Most 
countries now doubt the leadership skills and expertise of the leaders of countries in the euro 
zone and those appointed to manage financial decisions, with the ECB coming under scrutiny 
as contagion is generally the fear for most of the other countries. All the fears and speculations 
are of a possible breakup of the euro zone as most countries would take this route should the 
need arise in order to save their nations from downfall. The ECB has come up with measures 
Year  Event 
1999  The euro currency is made official 
2001  The member states joined by Greece 
2002  ECB introduces coins and notes 
2008  200billion stimulus plan is approved as back up due to financial crisis to aid growth 
of European countries 
2009 
-Orders are issued to Greece, France, Spain that they have to reduce budget 
deficits 
-alarm bells start going off concerning some of the member state`s  debts 
-Greece acknowledges their debt has accumulated to 300billion euro, double the 
euro zone limit 
2010 
-Greek accounting procedure is condemned for irregularities by the EU 
-Spain, Ireland, Portugal and Greece begin to raise concerns over their high debts 
-110billion euro given as a bailout package to Greece by euro zone members and 
IMF 
-Irish Republic also given bailout of 85 billion euro 
- speculation that Portugal will be next in line for a bailout 
2011 
-European Stability Mechanism worth 500billion Euros is set up as a bailout fund. 
-Portugal given 78billion euro in bailout fund 
-Greece given bailout of 109billion euro 
-European Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso states the debt crisis is 
affecting even countries outside the euro zone 
-ECB buys Spanish and Italian government bonds to bring down borrowing costs 
-talks of Greece failing to meet budget cut targets, speculation of a euro zone 
rescue plan emerges 
-Speculation of Greece leaving the euro zone 
-banks encouraged to raise capital to guard against any future government default 
losses 
-European union countries meet to try and forge an inter-government treaty that 
will have new budget rules to aid in crisis 
-plans for the treaty fail due to objections from Hungary and U.K 
2012 
-9 euro zone countries  and the bailout fund is downgraded by the credit rating 
agency Standard & Poor 
-fiscal pact is signed by 25 EU countries which will make it harder for countries to 
break budget deficits 
-euro zone backs Greeks 130billion euro second bailout 
-Spain raises concern as their governments 10year borrowing costs rise to 6% 
-Spain announces it will be applying for 100billion euro bailout 
-Speculation France and Italy will soon also need a bailout 
-Finance ministers and IMF agree to bailout Greece with loan installments totaling 
43.7 billion euro with the IMF insisting that Greece`s debt should be cut by 20%    
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that they hoped would alleviate the debt crisis such as the bond purchase program (ECB, 2012) 
that began in 2010 (Figure 2). 
 
 
Figure 2.ECB bond purchases 
Source: ECB (2012) 
 
This securities market program was aimed at the reduction of volatile behavior of the 
financial markets while improving liquidity. To do this the ECB absorbed a liquidity amount of 
219.5 billion euro to counter inflation from their actions of buying government and private debt 
securities of the same amount. 
 
2.3. East African Community (EAC) 
 
The year 1967 saw the formation of the EAC as the permanent tripartite commission for East 
African Co-operation. This union was short lived as it collapsed in 1977. Through mediation and 
various meetings the East African Community was once again considered in 1993, however full 
participation  only  began  in  1996  when  the  Secretariat  was  launched  in  Tanzania  (Deaton, 
1999).  The  countries  involved  were  Kenya,  Uganda  and  Tanzania.  A  meeting  to  formally 
establish the EAC and to sign the treaty was held in Tanzania in 1999. Issues that came up at 
this EAC meeting was for the establishment of a treaty to ensure the understanding of foreign 
policy co-ordination (Morales, 2012) whereby there would be no tariff rates and to implement 
the 80% tariff reduction objective set out by  the Common Market for Eastern and Southern 
Africa (COMESA), as well as to tackle how they can combine resources and fight terrorism in 
their  region.  At  this  meeting  the  admittance  of  Rwanda  and  Burundi  into  the  EAC  was 
postponed as it was argued by Tanzania that the joining criteria had not yet been established 
(Drummond and Ramirez, 2009). 
The objective of the EAC strives to strengthen and improve relations between the three 
countries in a bid to create a single market which would involve few travel restrictions, improving 
communication among other things. Their goal is to have one currency, a common passport, a 
double taxation accord and a common flag (Africa-Union, 2012). They aim to achieve these 
goals through: 
 
  promoting  sustainable growth and development for the region 
  establishing strong regional ties to promote development of the people 
  enhancing private and civil society participation in the communities; 
  encouraging women empowerment programs for the whole region 
  promoting good governance 
  promotion of peaceful activities throughout the region      
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Presently the EAC comprises of five countries, Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania and 
Uganda. The EAC  is regarded as the starting  point  of what they  hope to  become the East 
African Federation whereby member states would be combined into one single state (African 
Union Commission, 2012). A common market for capital, labor and goods was launched by the 
EAC in 2010 with the hope of establishing the single currency by the end of 2012, plus having 
their political federation by 2015. Diversification exists among the EAC members in the form of 
incomes and social indicators. The population of the EAC ranging at about 133million people, 
with a nominal GDP of US$79 billion (IMF, 2010). Of the EAC members, Kenya has the largest 
economy  as  their  nominal  GDP  of  US$32.1  billion  makes  up  41%  of  the  EAC’s  total  GDP. 
Burundi is the poorest member of the EAC with a nominal per capita GDP of US$180.  
   
Table 2. EAC countries mineral resources 
Uganda  copper, cobalt, hydropower, limestone, salt, arable land 
Burundi 
nickel, uranium, rare earth oxides, peat, cobalt, copper, platinum, vanadium, 
arable  land,  hydropower,  niobium,  tantalum,  gold,  tin,  tungsten,  kaolin, 
limestone 
Kenya  limestone,  soda  ash,  salt,  gemstones,  fluorspar,  zinc,  diatomite,  gypsum, 
wildlife, hydropower 
Rwanda  gold, cassiterite (tin ore), wolframite (tungsten ore), methane, hydropower, 
arable land 
Tanzania  hydropower,  tin,  phosphates,  iron  ore,  coal,  diamonds,  gemstones,  gold, 
natural gas, nickel 
Source: CIA World Factbook (2011) 
 
The East African economies are rich in mineral resources as seen in Table 2, however 
the member states are plagued with large informal sectors which is bound in turn to affect the 
East African Community as a whole as the growth prospects of the economy are restricted by 
undeclared incomes from the informal sector (EAC, 2010). In a bid to increase growth in the 
community, an agreement for trade was signed between the U.S and the EAC in 2008, this U.S 
& EAC agreement has made it possible for fruitful trade deals to be established with trade deals 
amounting to $1.4billion (EAC, 2010). 
EAC  Countries  over  the  past  years  have  developed  strong  macroeconominc 
management techniques. A reflection noted upon analysing the regions deficit indicators for the 
past ten years as can be seen from Table 3 below, the statistics revealing that the region has 
been doing well than expected considering the crisis. 
 
Table 3. East African community, deficit indicators, 2003-2011 
(Percent of GDP) 
  2003  2005  2007  2009  2011 
General government gross debt 
Burundi  171.96  137.0  132.0  35.3  35.3 
Kenya  60.59  50.8  46  47.6  48.9 
Rwanda  100.64  70.7  26.9  23.0  23.4 
Tanzania  63.51  62.8  37.0  37.1  44.4 
Uganda  99.57  75.3  23.3  22.2  29.2 
Total external debt 
Burundi  170.32  131.2  111.3  20.7  21.2 
Kenya  38.73  30.7  22.5  24.6  31.0 
Rwanda  85.17  58.3  15.3  14.1  15.2 
Tanzania  66.49  59.3  30.7  33.4  40.0 
Uganda  63.75  47.9  12.3  20.1  25.0 
Source: Gupta and McHugh (2012, p.63) 
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This is seen based on the fact that before 2008 when the crisis hit, th EAC Countries 
were doing well with their overall deficit ranging below 5% of GDP, meaning external debts were 
low as well. Higher public expenditure especially in the social sectors are a reflection of strong 
revenue  performance.  It  is  noted  that  the  increased  trade  openness  and  their  strong  policy 
frameworks assisted in reducing the EAC’s debt levels and somewhat buffering them from the 
global crisis (AfDB, 2010; Manasseh, 2012).  The EAC Countries however appear to be chasing 
after a number of objectives all independent of each other. As  a result the monetary policies for 
the EAC are inconsistent. As such inflation levels differ with the EAC countries and the inflation 
vilatility ratings are not consistent for the whole region (Muwanga, 2012). The region seems to 
prefer to chase after low interest rates and high intermediation although they could have done 
more by consolidating macro stability (Gupta and McHugh, 2012; Morales, 2012) 
 
 
Figure 3. Inflation and inflation volatility in EAC countries 
Source: Morales (2012, p.82)  
 
East African countries alongside other African countries have been affected negatively 
by the constantly volatile inflation fluctuations as illustrated in Figure 3 above, thus their need to 
come up with monetary and fiscal policies to combat this is the best option for the region. The 
main objective during this current global crisis is to make their region investor attractive in order 
to draw in the investors that would also be running away from the uncertainty in the euro zone. 
The more investor’s then inflation is likely to come down improving conditions economically in 
the EAC region. Unemployment is virtually too high in the region which is probably the cause of 
the booming informal sector  or is the contributing factor for the number of people leaving the 
country to seek employment abroad.  
 
2.4. Implications to EAC Countries 
 
The  fundamental  flaws  of  the  ECB  that  helped  accelerate  the  crisis  have  caused  a  lot  of 
pandemonium not just to Europe but to the world as a whole, as the whole world behaves as a 
global  village  as  such  there  is  a  limited  chance  that  the  crisis  was  not  going  to  spread 
worldwide. The EAC  would like to believe that they are unfazed by the crisis due to the policies 
they implemented but not noticing that due to the fact that Europe is the second largest trade 
partner after the United States then there is no way spillovers of the crisis could not trickle down 
to East African Countries. The trends for foreign demand and export prices have been going 
down at a steady pace. 
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Figure 4. Foreign demand and export prices in the EAC 
Source: Morales (2012) 
 
This is an expected occurrence due to the crisis based on the fact that East African 
countries all heavily depend on aid and humanitarian relief from Europe and due to this crisis 
and the stringent measures being taken by the European countries in order to try and stabilize 
the disharmony existing in their economy then they  will cut  down on government spending, 
reduce foreign direct investments as well as reduce volumes for trade as the people’s spending 
levels will also reduced in those countries as a result the amount of money whether in the form 
of aid or trade is bound to drastically reduce. Due to the crisis EAC have very little fiscal room to 
increase  demand  especially  now  as  the  EAC  alongside  all  other  African  countries  will  be 
struggling to maintain or expand their economic growth and their trade.  Figure 4 goes on to 
illustrate how the demand for African commodities is declining at a rapid pace so countries that 
depend  on  exports  like  oil  for-instance  will  suffer  greatly  for  they  are  faced  with  increasing 
pressure to establish another source of revenue. Economically, this means the East African 
Community  has  to  continue  fighting  high  levels  of  inflation  and  the  fact  that  the  European 
economy is far from recovery means the EAC will need to find a way to bring down their rate of 
inflation as this will damage their already struggling region that may find itself in a position it 
cannot get out of if swift action is not taken to protect the region from spiraling into depths they 
cannot get out of. Statistics reveal that when the Euro was performing well then the EAC was 
also performing well and that is the time that the region managed to recover and establish fiscal 
policies  that  enabled  their  growth  however,  looking  at  the  volatile  aspect  of  the  inflation 
predictions of the African region it reflects the inter-connectedness of the two regions EAC and 
Europe which the EAC would not like to acknowledge. The fact that their growth or downward 
trend is in tandem with what is happening in Europe indicates that the East African Federation 
that they seek to establish will not be as free from European influence as they would like to 
believe. 
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Figure 5. CPI inflation (Five-year moving avarage) 
Source: Gupta and McHugh (2012) 
 
Furthermore, according to Figure 5 we see that the EAC acquired some Eurobonds 
when the euro zone was showing signs of growth and success, however with the crisis it is only 
normal that the EAC members along with the other affected countries in the world would try and 
get  rid  of  large  amounts  of  these  bonds,  however  as  it  stands  by  virtue  of  being  the  bond 
holders these countries have put themselves at great risk and left themselves exposed to that 
which affects the euro. They may find themselves forced to hang on to the bonds as there will 
surely  be  a  shortage  of  buyers  at  the  present  moment  as  there  is  no  country  or  individual 
company  that  may  want  to  purchase  the  bonds  that  the  market  at  large  has  very  little 
confidence in. 
Most if not all countries in Africa are former colonies as a result very strong ties still 
exist, not just  through trade alone but also in the migration of both skilled and unskilled labor to 
European  countries.  This  benefited  EAC  countries  in  the  form  of  revenue  sent  by  the  East 
Africans living and working abroad but not only that but the investments they were making back 
home assisted in the growth of the EAC countries, however this is surely going to reduce as the 
crisis has brought on astronomical unemployment levels not just in Europe but in all regions that 
are affected by spillovers. To top it off it will mean companies downsizing and some closing this 
will have a negative effect on immigrants as they are the first to be retrenched and demoted to 
make room for survival for the natural citizens of those countries. In this state of joblessness 
these East Africans  will be forced to return home and the  downward spiral  will continue as 
unemployment and poverty levels will rise astronomically and will reduced aid coming in  the 
crisis may just spiral out of control this is a reality Africa as a whole has to prepare for. 
 
3. Suggestions 
 
The East African Community has accomplished quite a lot from their treaty agreement which 
has enabled the growth of their region; their desire to form one federal state is a commendable 
one which if implemented correctly could possibly achieve quite a lot for the region. With the 
formation of the federal state the region hopes to implement a single currency, however the 
current crisis with the euro zone should not be taken lightly as their downfall or challenges can 
serve  as  a  learning  curve  for  the  EAC.  The  euro  zone  established  the  single  currency  but 
neglected to put policies in place that would guard against such a crisis most importantly they 
did not have a fiscal policy that would align with the monetary policy that was laid out by the    
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European Central Bank. What the EAC can learn from this crisis is that having a single currency 
though noble an idea is not something that can be rushed into. The EAC members need to first 
sit  down  and  come  up  with  a  monetary  policy  and  fiscal  policy  that  will  apply  to  all  their 
countries, furthermore, the countries cannot act independently of one another and set different 
agendas if they are to become a single state as this aspect of seeking different goals is what 
has affected the euro zone. For the EAC region to become one state it means they should 
consider pooling in all their resources and agreeing to develop their region as one state. 
For the EAC region to have a single currency they should establish a central bank that 
sets out rules and regulations to other banks in the region, but the banks in different parts of the 
region should operate in line as though in one country applying to the same rules instead of 
having different rates and operational procedures as this creates differences in income levels, 
what is of utmost importance is that the richer parts of the region should strive to uplift the 
poorer  parts  of  the  region  then  when  a  level  of  stability  is  reached,  the  whole  region  then 
embarks on a growth strategy. With a united front which the euro zone lacks the EAC could 
become a very powerful region to contend with. 
The EAC is plagued with high levels of participants in the informal sector, meaning there 
are more people in the shadow economy, therefore the EAC should strive to formalize this 
region or make the economy easier for new business entrants as this too uplifts the economy in 
the form of income generation and employment. 
In  order  to  reduce  the  levels  of  risk  attached  to  the  euro  zone,  the  EAC  needs  to 
establish  relations  with  other  trade  investors  to  take  up  the  business  that  will  be  lost  from 
Europe  while  they  are  on  a  recovery  path,  China  or  other  African  regions  could  prove 
worthwhile trade partners. The need to diversify risk is important now, should they wait to react 
to whatever effects of the euro crisis may come their way may not work well for them.  
 
4. Conclusion    
 
The European Central Bank was established on fundamental flaws that have affected the world 
today  as  can  be  seen  in  the  crisis  that  presently  exists.  The  flaw  stemming  from  the  ill 
preparedness for certain risks as such making it difficult for the relevant authorities in the ECB 
to come up with a solution in time, the fact that it was not taken into consideration that a single 
currency region operating with a single monetary policy should have anticipated the need for a 
similar policy for the fiscal policy. As it stands the euro crisis has affected a lot of countries with 
the East African Community also suffering from the spillover effects. Being of particular interest 
due to their desire to also establish a monetary union under their single federation, should The 
EAC succeed in coming together to form one single state? For them to succeed pitfalls noted 
from the euro zone should be noted as learning curves for them to establish their own currency. 
The chances of them succeeding are there should they consider unifying their operations and 
establishing policies that will be adopted by all the regions in the EAC and not forgetting that 
they should not be independent of one another, the richer region assisting the poorer and from 
there focusing on the  growth of the nation as a whole. 
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